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Abstract
Ever since US president Richard Nixon declared a war on drugs in 1971,
different drug control policies have been implemented in both consumer and
producer countries. These include policies ranging from crop eradication to an
interdiction of drug shipments to outright legalisation of drug possession. In this
paper we develop a novel endogenous growth framework that unifies international
trade, drugs control and accounts for consumers’rational addiction and optimizing
choice of drug consumption. Our results emphatically show that a one size-fits-all
approach to drug control is ineffective. We show that there exists a production
-consumption growth trade-off around the policy priority not previously
documented in the literature. Moreover, we show that in the absence of a
fundamental change to drug demand, drug control policies are unlikely to reduce
illicit trades for drugs and guns in the long run.
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1 Introduction
The link between illicit drugs, guns, and economic development is the subject of a
long-standing debate about optimal substance abuse control strategies [see, for instance,
Miron (2001), Demombynes (2011)]. Research in the U.S. has suggested that crime was
prevalent around the period of the crack epidemic because the trade fueled demand for
guns (Blumstein, 1995; Blumstein et al., 2000).1 Since Richard Nixon formally declared
a war on drugs in 1971, different policies have been implemented in consumer, producer
and transit countries (Whitford and Yates, 2009). These include policies ranging from
crop eradication to an interdiction of drug shipments to outright legalization of drug
possession. The results have been mixed, with the policy stance in several states and
countries gradually shifting from prohibition to liberalization. The illicit drug trade, as
well as its associated illicit trades in firearms, remains highly persistent, with activities by
drug-related syndicates based in the Central American and Caribbean regions continuing
to be a subject of frequent press coverage in the United States.
Against this backdrop, the general diffi culties of doing research on illicit drug trades
mean that, beyond primary fieldwork-based research, there remains a vacuum in terms of
the existing body of evidence on the macroeconomics of drugs, with studies of consumers
and the drugs supply chain tending to be largely separate. In fact, although a tough
policy stance remains the general consensus, there are some researchers who have argued
that aggressive drug enforcement is not only ineffective but also potentially amplifies
crime.2 For instance, Becker et al. (2006) note that if the demand for drugs is inelastic,
increased enforcement will increase the price and reduce consumption, but it will also
increase the total resources available to drug syndicates. Likewise, in Ortiz (2003, 2009),
1In its report, the Latin American Commission on Drugs and Democracy (2016) highlighted this
linkage: “the relationship between homicide, firearm, and drug commerce is central. Drugs finance the
purchase of firearms, which in turn are used as indirect factors of drugs production and traffi cking.”
2There has also been experiments with greater liberalization of drug policy. As an example, the
authorities in Portugal decriminalized the use of all drugs in 2001 and unleashed a major public health
campaign to tackle addiction.
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drug policy ineffectiveness is due to drug producers responding by improving productivity
to compensate for the increased repression. Under these conditions, facing robust revenue,
drug syndicates are better equipped to further purchase weapons to aid their illicit trades.3
To date, the applied-theory literature on the macroeconomics of illicit drugs is very
small (some exceptions are: Rydell et al., 1996; Becker et al., 2006; Naranjo, 2007;
Grossman and Mejía, 2008; Costa Storti and De Grauwe, 2009; Ortiz, 2009; Chumacero,
2010; Mejía and Restrepo, 2011; Mejía and Restrepo, 2016; Greenfield et al., 2017).
Unfortunately, these papers have all focused on partial equilibrium analysis or the
vertical supply-chain of illicit drugs. For instance, Caulkins et al. (2001) and Rydell et
al. (1996) use a partial equilibrium approach to study the policy trade-off between
treatment and enforcement policies in reducing the consumption of illegal drugs. They
show that spending on treatment and enforcement should vary as the size of the
problem. Specifically, they show that treatment should receive a larger share of control
resources when a drug problem is mature than when it is first growing. If initiation rates
subsequently decline, enforcement’s budget share should drop further in the ensuing
declining stage of the epidemic. Similarly, Grossman and Mejía (2008) study the relative
effi ciency and effectiveness of eradication and interdiction efforts in a partial equilibrium
game theory model. They show that from 2001 through 2003 subsidies from the United
States to the Colombian armed forces under Plan Colombia caused a decrease in the
exportation of drugs from Colombia to about 44% of what exportation was before Plan
Colombia was implemented. Notwithstanding, the benefits in the U.S. in terms of drug
addiction was not commensurate.
Nevertheless, the market for illegal drugs hides complex interactions that should be
addressed using models that can account for general equilibrium effects, especially when
evaluating large-scale policy interventions. Some recent papers incorporating these
3Evidence for this hypothesis comes from a long-term look at the evolution of crime rate in the U.S.:
Dills et al. (2010) show that increases in enforcement of drug prohibition in the U.S. over the past 100
years have been associated with increases in crime rate.
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effects include Becker et al. (2006), Naranjo (2007), Costa Storti and De Grauwe (2009),
Chumacero (2010), Mejía and Restrepo (2011) and Mejía and Restrepo (2016). We
expand the literature by adopting a horizontal perspective to model the illicit drugs and
guns trade. This allows us to develop a unified endogenous growth framework with
international trade and drugs control that also accounts for consumers’ rational
addiction and optimizing choice of drug consumption.
In this vein, to date, research has been missing a unified growth framework that
includes the integration of formal international trade and illicit drug-for-gun trade, as
well as different drugs control policies aimed at consumers, producers and intermediate
trans-shipments. Our paper aims to address this by developing a two-country,
endogenous growth framework with international and illicit drug-for-gun trades.
Specifically, we build a two-country, multi-sectorial dynamic general equilibrium model
of endogenous growth with drugs and guns trade that is solved both analytically and
computationally. The parameterized version, an illustrative ‘source’economy based on
five regional developing economies (El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Jamaica, and
Mexico) that are controversially known as ‘nest’of illicit drugs and guns trade to/from
the U.S., is then used to study various drug-control policies. As shown in Figure 1 and
2, the context of our analysis is supported by cross-country evidence. Drug usage,
proxied by annual prevalence rate from the UNODC drug statistics and the rate of
civilian-held firearms using data from the 2017 Small Arms Survey are both positively
correlated with GDP per capita (about 38%). Similarly, the rate of civilian-held firearms
and drugs are also significantly positively correlated (31%).
To preview our results, while prohibitive drug-control policy (both at the
end-consumer and supply side) is trade- and growth-enhancing to the formal sector, we
uncover a production-consumption growth trade-off that has not been previously
documented in the literature. Hence, if private consumption growth is prioritized in the
consuming country over output growth, there is rationale for drug liberalization. Indeed,
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the policy effect is nonlinear in that, the more open the consuming country is (a larger
share of imported tradables in final consumption), the wider the range of initial
rational-addiction condition that would allow drug liberalization policy to be
growth-enhancing. In addition, in the absence of any fundamental change to drug
demand, our policy experiments find that drug control policies is unlikely to reduce
illicit trades for drugs and guns in the long run. A more direct supply-side policy aimed
at eradicating drug cultivation appears to be less effective, and its effectiveness would
depend a lot on the openness of the supplying country. We believe some of these
findings provide partial explanation on the mixed outcome observed from the global war
on drugs over the past few decades.
The rest of the paper are structured as follows. Section 2 describes the theoretical
model. Section 3 defines the dynamic and balanced growth equilibrium, and then
proceeds to solve the model. In Section 4, the parameterization strategy is discussed.
The various illustrative drug-control policy experiments, structured according to
different policy themes, are presented in Section 5. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 The Model
We present a two-country dynamic general equilibrium model with international trade.
Country A is a ‘physical capital-rich’developed economy populated by a representative
household who consumes ordinary tradable goods (domestically produced and traded
from Country B) and drugs– the latter modelled as a rationally addicted good that is
not produced in Country A. Firms in Country A produces ordinary tradable goods using
labor and physical capital. There is also a price-taking firm producing guns, using a
proprietary technology and inputs of domestically produced ordinary tradables.4 Due
4Alternatively, one can argue that the production of guns requires the use of physical capital.
Given that the ordinary tradables produced in Country A have already used both labor and physical
capital as inputs, specifying guns as being a transformation of ordinary tradables would have the same
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to legal restriction, the guns produced are not sold to the household, but exported to
Country B and purchased by the Government in Country A. The Government taxes labor
and capital income, as well as the sales of guns. Although the Government can discourage
drugs by influencing the overall climate for drug consumption, it is not deemed as a
criminal offense.
Country B is a ‘physical capital-poor’developing economy that is trade-dependent to
Country A. It is populated by identical individuals and a drug syndicate. Individuals do
not hold physical capital, consume ordinary tradables (domestically produced and
traded from Country A), and do not consume drugs. Instead, they supply labor hours to
both a representative firm in the formal sector producing ordinary tradables, as well as a
drug syndicate who produces drugs. Both production activities in Country B are human
capital-driven (similar to Mocan et al., 2005), with the individuals having a choice to
invest in formal human capital but not drug-specific human capital. The drug syndicate
is modelled as a stylized agent similar in fashion to Blackburn et al. (2017) and related
studies5, who maximizes its expected payoff by producing drugs using effective labor
hours and guns imported from Country A (in line with the time series evidence of
Millán-Quijano, 2019, who shows a positive cocaine prices-crime relationship in supplier
countries). The drug syndicate’s productivity depends on the average level of
drug-specific human capital (interpretable as some sort of cultural capital), which in
equilibrium, equals to the accumulated stock of drugs addiction in Country A. This
means that the growth of the illicit human capital over time, which cannot be
accumulated via deliberate acquisition of education, would reflect the overall magnitude
of the illicit trade (proxied by its accumulated flows over time). This is similar to the
concept of a “standing on shoulder”effect for knowledge/ideas (Jones, 2005), where the
interpretation. Instead, productivity of guns-production benefits from an Arrow-Romer type of knowledge
spillover embedded in the physical capital stock in Country A.
5In practice, organized drug syndicates tend to have much more sophisticated structure, as documented
in contributions such as Levitt and Venkatesh (2000) and similar case studies. In a two-country,
multi-sectorial general equilibrium framework, some of these features are abbreviated.
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level of illicit human capital would reflect all the learnings from/associated with all the
past accumulated drug production.
Our specification for Country B essentially ‘merges’ the production chains of
illicit-crop farming and drug traffi cking into a single drug syndicate, as compared to the
vertically-integrated model of Mejía and Restrepo (2016). Nevertheless, given that most
mechanisms (in the different vertical production chains) in their model operate through
resource (re-)allocation, the differences– in terms of transmission mechanisms– of our
simplified specification for Country B are largely immaterial in a long-run context.
Instead, we trade some of the vertical features off for a greater horizontal perspective on
the illicit drugs and guns trades, by developing a two-country, multi-sectorial dynamic
general equilibrium framework, hence allowing for the examination of dynamic tradeoff
and long-run growth implications of drug-control policies. Overall, the assumed
asymmetries between the two countries are by design, and capture the differences
between a physical capital-intensive, “richer” economy and a physical
capital-inadequate, “poorer” economy whose formal sector is trade-dependent to the
larger consumer country, with its best option out of a “drug-cultivation trap” will be
through a reallocation away of human capital from the drug-producing to the formal
sectors, as argued in LSE (2014).
2.1 Country A
Country A Household: The representative household in Country A faces a risk
neutral expected lifetime utility, which depends on the chosen sequences of consumption
of ordinary tradable goods (a bundle of tradable home good and imported good), Ct+s,




















where CAt is an aggregate index of consumption, ςCA > 0 intertemporal elasticity of





t , the share of total time endowment
(normalized to unity) spent working, with Lit denoting the raw labor hours provided to
the i firms, Λ ∈ (0, 1) the subjective discount factor, Ξt is the period t stock of
accumulated past drugs consumption taken as given by household, Et the expectation
operator conditional on the information available at the beginning of period t.
Instantaneous utility is therefore additively separable in terms of the consumption of
ordinary tradable goods and drugs.6
In each period t, the utility derived from drugs consumption depends on an overall
climate factor, which, for convenience, assumed to be an exogenously given value, π,
uniformly distributed on the support (0, 1]. To avoid corner solution, π > 0, so that the
household always derives positive utility from rational addiction. This simple specification
can be interpretable as a continuous measure of how likely the possession of drugs is
acceptable in society and therefore avoid confiscation and punishment by the government.
As such, addiction is not state-dependent, and that drug possession is assumed to be not
a criminal offense.7 Further, in line with the tradition of Becker and Murphy (1988), we
assume addiction is both time-consistent and rational, and the utility generated from drugs
consumption depends on both current and past accumulated consumption.8 Specifically,
the stock of past consumption, Ξt, is specified to evolve according to Ξt+1 = (1−φ)Ξt+ξt,
or equivalently,
6In spite of the additive separable functional form, current-period drug consumption (ξt) is
quasi-complementary to past accumulated consumption (Ξt), a key feature that is consistent with
the rational addiction literature in the tradition of Becker and Murphy (1988), with relatively more
sophisticated utility specification of rational addiction further discussed in Orphanides and Zervos (1995),
Gruber and Köszegi (2001).
7While debatable, the simplification in assuming drug as not a imprisonable offense is in line with
empirical evidence such as Kuziemko and Levitt (2004), which documented that the overall impact of
increased drug incarceration has been very small in reducing the criminal incidence.
8In microeconomic studies focusing on cigarettes’addiction, such as Gruber and Koszegi (2001), agents
with time-inconsistent optimization problem are considered. They also consider the self-control problem
of a sophisticated agent, whose consumption decision is modelled as a subgame-perfect equilibrium in a




= (1− φ) + ξt
Ξt
, (2)
where φ ∈ [0, 1] measures the degree of persistence of addiction from accumulated past
consumption of drugs. If φ = 0, past addiction does not diminish over time, while
φ = 1 means drugs consumptions in the past do not influence the accumulation/addiction
process.
In addition to labor supply (although raw labor hours are chosen, household is
remunerated wT,At based on effective hours, which in turn depends on productivity that
is affected by drug consumption), household also owns and supplies physical capital at
each period t, the income of which taxed at constant rates, τL and τK , respectively.
Similar to studies with tradable goods framework, such as Agénor (2016), consumption
decisions on ordinary tradable goods follow a two-step process: first, the optimal path of
total consumption over time is determined, the amount from which is then allocated
between spending on domestic and foreign tradables. The representative household
maximizes (1) by choosing the optimal sequences of ordinary tradable consumption, CAt ,
labor, LT,At , drugs consumption, ξt, and the physical capital stock in the next period,
Kt+1, subject to the end-of-period budget constraint,




Kt+1 = (1− δK)Kt + It, (4)
taking wages (wT,At ), labor productivity (A
T,A
t ), real interest rate (r
T,A
t ), tax rates, price
of tradable goods (P Tt ), and price of drugs (P
ξ
t ) as given.
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Equation (5) is the Euler equation associated with ordinary consumption; equation (6)
is the corresponding version for drug consumption (which depends on the growth of the
total stock of past consumption, Ξt+1/Ξt, given by (2); equation (7) describes the marginal
rate of substitution between labor supply and ordinary tradable consumption; (8) is the
optimality condition for the marginal rate of substitution between drugs consumption and
labor supply.
Combining (7) and (8), the ordinary-drugs consumption ratio of the representative















which depends on the accumulated stock of past drugs consumption, and the relative
market price ratio of the two “goods”. To ensure stationarity on the balanced growth
path, it is assumed that ςCA[ηΞ(1− ςΞ) + 1]/ςΞ = 0.





t ), where C
A,A
t is consumption of ordinary tradables home good and






where θ ∈ (0, 1). The second stage of the optimization problem for the representative









t , which yields an optimal consumption allocation between Country A’s
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(CA,At ) and Country B’s tradables (C
A,B







Country A Production: The tradable goods are produced by a continuum of
identical perfectly competitive firms i ∈ (0, 1), using effective labor, AT,At Li,T,At , and
private physical capital, Ki,At . The production function of firm i is given by









where the productivity of firms i, Qi,T,At , evolves according to the sectorial-wide physical
capital intensity. Specifically, productivity of firm i is subject to a sector-wide
Arrow-Romer type of externality, congested by the total employment in the sector (in










Ki,At di, $T > 0.





t − wT,At (AT,At Li,T,At )− rT,At Ki,At ,
with respect to the private inputs, taking production function, productivity, and input






































or equivalently, after substituting in (13),
















where AA0 > 0, and υA ∈ R measures the strength of the drugs’ effects on labor
productivity. υA is parameterized as a negative value for benchmark case to account for
the adverse effect of drugs consumption on labor productivity. The current-period drug
consumption is scaled by the accumulated drug consumption (Ξt) to provide a scale
adjustment so that the effective contemporaneous effect of drug consumption to labor
productivity depends also on how prevalent drug consumption is. If it is already
prevalent, then an existing labor who is already used to drug consumption will
experience less negative effect than a labor who has never experienced drug before.
Substituting (17) into (16), we can write












Likewise, using the two first-order conditions in (14), we derive a ratio of the factor

























Assumption: β = $T . To derive endogenous growth, we restrict our analysis by
imposing the assumption, which then allows us to write (18) as a ratio of the ordinary











Guns production: Due to legal restriction, guns are produced by a single firm in
Country A. The production of guns is taxed by the government at a constant rate of
τG. Guns are not sold to households. Instead, guns are exported to Country B and sold
to the Government for Country A. The price of guns, PGt , is set by the world market
(given the two-country context, this means the demand of buyers from Country B), with
the purchase of the Government for Country A following the same world price.9 The
guns-producing firm has a proprietary production technology of






where χ ≥ 0, Y T,AGt is the quantity of ordinary tradables used in guns’production, and AGt





ω, where similar to ordinary tradable
production, the productivity of the firm benefits from knowledge spillover embedded in
the aggregate physical capital stock of the economy, at a rate ω > 0.
Given the tax rate and the perfectly competitive market for physical capital, the profit






t − P Tt Y
T,AG
t ,
9With this specification, we essentially treats all illicit component of world gun trades as the exported
share, while the purchase made by the government in Country A is interpreted as all other legal purchases.
As such, given that the government has imperfect information on the international buyer of guns, it is
reasonable to levy any tax rate of guns at the production stage, and not sales stage.
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Assumption: ω = 1− χ. Again, to get endogenous growth, we restrict our analysis














Government of Country A: The government in Country A does not borrow and
maintains a balanced budget in each period t. The government collects taxed income
from the labor and physical capital, as well as from total guns production (PGt Y
G,A
t ). The
government spends on consumption of domestically produced ordinary tradables (GAt ),
guns produced in Country A (GGt ). In addition, the government gets realizable value
from confiscated drugs in each period, Rt. For simplicity, we assume that the rebate is a
very small fraction, z ∈ (0, 1) of the confiscated drugs:
Rt = z(1− π)P ξt ξt. (24)






















Without losing generality, government consumption of the ordinary tradables is
assumed to be a fixed fraction of the domestic households’consumption,
GAt = νC
A,A
t , ν ∈ (0, 1). (26)
2.2 Country B
Country B Individuals: In Country B, there is a unit mass of identical individuals
j ∈ (0, 1). Each individual j is endowed with one unit of time in each period t, and
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for simplicity, individuals do not value leisure in Country B and time is fully allocated







j,t = 1. Nevertheless, individuals do face some degree of
disutility from working, interpretable as due to poor working conditions. Individuals in
Country B consume ordinary tradables and are assumed to not consume drugs. Wage
income is paid to effective labor in both sectors in that it is influenced by the level of
human capital/productivity, though individuals can only invest in formal human capital.
In other words, investment in the level of formal human capital that is useful in ordinary
tradable production, HT,Bj,t , is a choice variable. Each individual j therefore chooses a
sequence of investment, IT,Bj,t+s (in tradable price), total consumption, C
B
j,t+s, the labor
hours supplied to both ordinary tradable sector (LT,Bj,t+s) and the drug syndicate (L
ξ,B
j,t+s),
for s = 0, 1, ...,∞, to maximize expected utility,
















where Λ ∈ (0, 1) the common subjective discount factor, ςCB > 0 intertemporal elasticity




















and the time constraint LT,Bj,t + L
ξ,B
j,t = 1, taking the profits received from owning the
representative firm, JTBt [ξj ∈ (0, 1) being the fraction of the profits claimed by individual
j] , the respective real wage for employment in the ordinary tradable and drugs production
sector, wT,Bt and w
ξ,B
t , the average drug-specific productivity level, H
ξ,B
j,t , and the tradable
price, P Tt , as given.
The human capital of individual j evolves according to
HT,Bj,t+1 = ΘHBI
T,B
j,t + (1− δHB)H
T,B
j,t , (29)
where ΘHB > 0 is the effi ciency of human capital investment and δ
HB ≥ 0 is the
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depreciation rate of human capital.



































Consumption decisions follow a two-step process too. Let CB,Bj,t is consumption of
ordinary tradables home good and CB,Aj,t the imported tradables from Country A. Total






where % ∈ (0, 1). The second stage of the optimization problem for each individual j is
















Country B production: The tradable goods are produced by a price-taking
representative firm using only labor. The production technology is decreasing
returns-to-scale and given by








where α ∈ (0, 1), HT,Bt and LT,Bt are the average human capital level and total labor hours
employed in the tradable sector.
Productivity of the ordinary tradables-producing firm in Country B, QT,Bt , is assumed
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to depend linearly on a scale factor from its trading partner, proxied by the ordinary
tradable output-to-physical capital ratio of Country A, as well as a knowledge spillover
effect from the (aggregate) stock of formal human capital in Country B, at a magnitude










As would become clear in the policy experiments section later, this specification
means growth in Country B’s tradable production can only be driven by growth in HT,Bt
[indirectly, policy parameters in (29)] in the steady state, as any other change in policy
arrangements will be growth-neutral and only bring about level effect on tradable
production in Country B. The rationale underlying this deliberate choice is twofold: (i)
to reflect the historical trade and production dependency of the small Central American
economies (Country B) to the large consumer economy (USA), which means any
productivity gain over time must therefore be from the learning/knowledge spillover
from the production in Country A; and (ii) to capture some of the well-documented
persistency in the mediocre growth rates observed in many source countries for drugs
cultivation [see LSE (2014) and Buxton (2015)].






t −wT,Bt HT,Bt LT,Bt ,








Given that individuals are identical, we know that the average and individual-specific
productivity level in the economy is the same, HT,Bt = H
T,B
j,t .
Assumption: φ1 +α = 1. To eventually generate endogenous growth for the ordinary









Drug Syndicate: Similar to Blackburn et al. (2017) and other similar studies in
the literature of organized crime, such as Alexeev et al. (2004) and Kugler et al. (2005),
the drugs sector is modelled as an independent entity from the households in Country B.
In other words, the crime syndicate is modelled as a rational decision maker whose sole
objective is to maximize its expected payoff from producing drugs, E(vξt ). For simplicity,
we assume the crime syndicate does not consume ordinary tradables. The drugs’










where ϕ ∈ (0, 1), and AR0 > 0 is a time-invariant constant productivity level of the
drugs-producer. Hξ,Bt L
ξ,B
t is the effective labor hours used in producing drugs, with a
one-to-one relationship assumed between drug-specific human capital (which is akin to a
type of cultural capital that is common across all workers working in drugs production)
and the total accumulated world drugs consumption, in that, Hξ,Bt = Ξt∀t.10 Drugs’
production also uses GFt amount of guns purchased from Country A.
Also, consider a policy variable q, which measures an uncertain production capacity of
the drug syndicate, assumed to be uniformly distributed on (0, 1]. Intuitively, a reduction
in the value of q may reflect a higher degree of intensity Country B is in pursuing the ‘war
on drugs’, be it stepping up its raiding activities of drug-production facilities or increasing
the frequency of aerial spraying to destroy crop farms. The problem of the drug syndicate
10This specification basically means that the growth of the illicit human capital over time, which cannot
be accumulated via deliberate acquisition of education, and is akin to a form of social/cultural capital,
must necessarily reflect the overall magnitude of the illicit trade (as reflected by its accumulated flows
over time). This is similar to the concept of a “standing on shoulder”effect for knowledge/ideas (Jones,
2005), where the level of illicit human capital would reflect all the learnings from/associated with all the
past accumulated drug production.
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1−ϕ −wξ,Bt Hξ,Bt Lξ,Bt − PGt GFt , by choosing raw
labor hours, Lξ,Bt (it has no control over the economy-wide drug-specific human capital,
which is akin to a type of cultural capital), and number of guns, GFt , yielding first-order
conditions of:






t , and (40)
qP ξt (1− ϕ)ξt = PGt GFt , (41)












Drug distribution: Even though the equilibrium price of drugs, P ξt , reflects
directly the world demand [from (9)] and supply [from (40)] of drugs, the distribution of
drugs produced in Country B to households in Country A are also assumed to be costly,
hence driving a wedge between the international price of drugs and ordinary tradables in
equilibrium. Specifically, adopting a specification that is commonly used in models with
costly distribution (Burstein et al., 2003; Agénor, 2016), distributing/smuggling a unit
of drug requires using κt units of Country B-produced ordinary tradables traded to
Country A (CDistt = κtC
A,B
t ). Specifically, this results in:
P ξt
P Tt
= (1 + κt), (43)
where κt = κ0(
ξt
Ξt
)−ρ. This means the larger the quantity of current drugs production is,
the lower the spread between drug price and ordinary tradable good. The larger the past
accumulated drugs consumed (in other words, the more established world drugs trade is),
the higher the price mark-up of drugs.11
11Alternatively, instead of such a two-step specification, the distribution cost can also be integrated
into the profit maximization problem of the drug syndicate. The first-order condition obtained in that
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Rewriting (43), we can express the price ratio of drugs and tradables as:
P ξt
P Tt





In Country A, the equilibrium conditions of the factor markets for physical capital
and labor are given by Kt = KAt , and Lt = L
T,A
t . For the ordinary tradable goods
produced in Country A, equating supply to demand, which consists of private
consumption by households in Country A, investment, government consumption, inputs
used in guns-production, and those traded to Country B (CB,At ), we have
Y T,At = C
A,A







For Country B, we first impose the symmetric equilibrium assumption, where all















t . All individual and aggregate behaviors
are consistent, and by implication of the identical human capital investment decisions, all
individual-specific human capital equal the economy-wide average level of human capital,










t = 1 holds due to
symmetry.
For the ordinary tradables produced in Country B, the supply, Y T,Bt , equals the
demand, which consists of private consumption by households in Country B, those
traded to Country A (CA,Bt ), and those used in distributing drugs to Country A,










t , we have
Y T,Bt = C
B,B
t + (1 + κt)C
A,B
t . (46)
There is free international trade between the two countries for the ordinary tradables.
case would have no material difference to (43).
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Therefore, the ordinary tradable goods prices are equalized across the two countries at P Tt
in each period t. However, note that factor prices are not equalized, given the different
production structures of the two countries are different.
The international market equilibrium for guns are given by





3 Equilibrium and solutions
A dynamic international trade equilibrium for the two-country model described is a
















t }∞t=0, physical capital stock in Country A {KAt }∞t=0,
accumulated stocks in Country B {Hξ,Bj,t , H
T,B


















t }∞t=0, constant government policy parameters (τL, τK , τG, ν) such that, given




0 ,Ξ0 > 0,
a) representative household in Country A maximizes expected utility by choosing
consumption allocations for ordinary tradables, drugs, and labor supply, subject to their
intertemporal budget constraint;
b) individuals in Country B maximize expected utility by choosing consumption
allocations for ordinary tradables, labor supplies to both production sectors, investment
in formal human capital, subject to their intertemporal budget constraint;
c) firms in the ordinary tradable goods sector in Country A maximize profits, choosing
labor and private capital, taking input prices, productivity, and initial stocks as given;
d) the single guns-producing firm in Country A maximizes profits by choosing the
amount of ordinary tradables to be used, taking the proprietary production technology
and prices as given;
e) representative firm in Country B maximizes profits by choosing effective labor input,
taking wages and productivity as given;
f) drug syndicate in Country B maximizes expected payoff by choosing effective labor
input and guns, taking prices, wage, and aggregate uncertainty as given;
g) the Government in Country A maintains a balanced budget; and
h) all markets clear.
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For a given set of parameters, a stationary equilibrium is where: (i) the
current-to-accumulated drug consumption ratio (ΦξΞt = ξt/Ξt), ordinary tradable-drugs
consumption ratio of Household in Country A (ΦCAξt = C
A
t /ξt), ordinary tradable
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t ), Country B’s household consumption-to-Country A’s physical




t ), and the ordinary tradable output-to-drugs produced
ratio in Country B (ΦYTBξt = Y
T,B
t /ξt) are all constant; (ii) factor returns, wages, and
prices are constant, and (iii) the drugs-ordinary tradable market price ratio (P ξt /P Tt )
and the guns-ordinary tradable market price ratio (PGt /P
T
t ) are also constant.
Next, a balanced growth equilibrium (BGE) is a stationary equilibrium in which: (i)
by implications of free trade, both Country A and Country B grow at a constant rate;























t ) all grow at a constant,
endogenous rate γ; and (iii) their ratios satisfy the stationary equilibrium properties.
The dynamic system characterizing the solutions is solved for and summarized in the
end of Appendix A. We study the solutions under the stationary equilibrium,
characterized by the set of simultaneous equations solved for in Appendix B, with the
relevant steady-state variables denoted in tildes. For simplicity, we set the ordinary
tradable price to be the base price, P̃ T = 1. Given the complexity of the system,
stability of the economy cannot be studied analytically. However, it is established
numerically by first solving for an initial BGE. Post-shocks, following a permanent
change in the relevant policy parameter value(s), we then solve for a new stationary
equilibrium of which the system converges to in a finite number of periods. As such,
although we started off by establishing a BGE, we subsequently allow the transitory




For an illustrative representation of the model, we calibrate the parameters of Country
A so as to match the endogenous ratios along the BGE to the first moment of the respective
annual series for the United States (U.S.) in the 1990-2015 period.12 For drugs, as a
self-containing measure, we focus only on the plant-based drugs of cocaine and cannabis.
For Country B, to match the BGE characterization, the parameterization is based on the
average value of the 5 economies of El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Jamaica, and
Mexico. All 5 economies: (i) are well-documented in the various publications of United
Nations Offi ce on Drugs and Crime [for instance, UNODC (2015-18)] to be major illicit
cocaine or cannabis suppliers to the U.S., (ii) have formal trade sector that significantly
depends on the U.S.; (iii) are controversially known for drug syndicates that involve in
illicit drugs and guns trades on the American soil. On average, real GDP growth rate of
the 5 economies is slightly above 2.5 percent during the 1990-2015 period, hence allowing
for the setting of balanced growth rate, γ = 0.025 to match that of Country A.
Given the annual time frequency and subsequent parameterization, the discount factor
is at Λ = 0.995, which corresponds to annual net return on physical capital of 4.5 percent.
For Country A Household’s utility function, the labor preference parameter, ηL, and the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution for ordinary tradables, ςCA, are set according to
Smets and Wouters (2007) at 2.0 and 0.667 (which corresponds to 1.5 in their utility
specification). The inverse of Frisch elasticity of labor supply is set at a fairly standard
value of 1.5, in line with meta analysis of Chetty et al. (2011). For the parameters related
12Ideally, a full Bayesian calibration is implemented. However, data series on quarterly drugs and guns’
sales are not available, and the annual reporting of firearms and drugs is merely on voluntary basis and
therefore have huge gaps. An illustrative moments-matching calibration strategy is therefore the only
strategy we can pursue.
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to rational addiction of drugs, from (8), it can be seen that the price elasticity of drugs
consumption is approximated in the model by −1/ςΞ. The elasticity of intertemporal
substitution of drugs, ςΞ, is therefore being set at 1/0.46 = 2.174, which is within the
range of estimates in Pacula et al. (2001) and in line with Grossman (2004). Given this,
to satisfy the necessary condition, ςCA
ςΞ
[ηΞ(1− ςΞ)+1] = 0, we set ηΞ = 0.852. For the rate
of (anti-)persistency, φ, the empirically documented estimates for cigarettes addiction by
studies such as Gruber and Köszegi (2001) are within the 0.5− 0.9 range. We set φ = 0.5
to reflect the more addictive nature of drugs consumption. With Φ̃ξΞ = φ + γ, which
means the steady-state current-to-accumulated drug consumption ratio equals 0.525.
For the overall “drug-consumption”climate factor, π, which can be interpreted as a
proxy for drug liberalization, we set π = 0.5 in the absence of such an existing empirical
estimate. Next, using the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) statistics, dividing the
sum of imported consumer goods by personal consumption expenditures gives an average
of 0.145. From (11), this means θ = 1− 0.145 = 0.855.
For ordinary tradable production in Country A, the elasticity value with respect to
effective labor, β, is set at 0.64, which is the common value used for United States in
studies such as Christiano et al. (2005). Given the assumption β = $T , this means
the strength of the Arrow-Romer externality with regards to physical capital stock is
also 0.64. For the elasticity of labor productivity with respect to drugs consumption,
we opt for a negative effect for the benchmark case by setting υA = −0.018.13 Next,
based on the International Monetary Fund (IMF) capital stock dataset, the average final
output-to-physical capital ratio of the United States is approximately 0.679, which is set
as the value of Φ̃YTAKA along the balanced growth path. Likewise, applying the household
consumption share as a percentage of GDP series from the BEA to the IMF capital stock
dataset, we calculate Country A’s tradable consumption-to-physical capital ratio in the
13The value corresponds to North America’s annual prevalence rate of drugs consumption (UNODC,
2018). This means the parameterization strategy involves implicitly assuming that the prevalence of drug
usage in the population translates to an equivalent effect on the aggregate labor productivity.
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= 14.76 is calculated. From (17), this means AA0 = 14.59.
After that, using (18), given all the other parameterization, the productivity parameter,
QT,A0 = 0.1213 is estimated. Given these calibrations, and using the first-order conditions
for r̃T,A, we determine the physical capital depreciation rate, δK , at a relatively high 0.2,
so as to give an annual net (of depreciation) return on physical capital of 4.5 percent.
For guns, we rely on the various editions of the annual statistical update on firearms
production and sales published by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and
Explosives, United States (ATF) for the parameterization. In the period of 1990-2015,
6.2 percent of total guns manufactured in the United States are exported, which gives us
the ratio of G̃F over Ỹ G,A, and indirectly, its share against those purchased by the
government in Country A, G̃G. For the tax rate on guns production, τG, based on the
total tax revenues collected under the National Firearms Act (occupational tax plus
transfer & making tax) and the estimated revenue of the guns and ammunition industry
[see Brauer (2013) and various reported figures by the Firearms Industry Trade
Association (NSSF)], τG = 0.003 is estimated. For the production parameters, in the
absence of existing estimates, the time-invariant shift parameter, AG0 , is set at one.
Further, a very small elasticity of guns’production with respect to tradable inputs is set
at χ = 0.05, which given the assumption ω = 1 − χ = 0.95, means guns production
benefits immensely from knowledge spillover associated with the economy wide physical
capital stock– a reasonable feature consistent with anecdotal evidence.
For the Government in Country A, the labor and physical capital income tax rates are
calibrated based on the average wage income tax rate faced by a childless single person at
100% of average earnings (as estimated by the OECD) and the statutory corporate income
tax rate, yielding τL = 0.174 and τK = 0.350 respectively. The share of government
consumption as a percentage of the domestically produced tradables is estimated using
the BEA statistics again, which gives ν = 0.340. Lastly, the fraction of realizable value
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from confiscated drugs, z, is set at a very low rate of 0.05.
For the preference parameters in Country B, for consistency and due to a general
lack of country-specific macroeconomic studies for the sample economies, the same
values for the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, the inverse value of Frisch
elasticity, and the labor preference parameter are used, where ςCB = 0.667, ψB = 1.5,
and ηB = 2.0. The share of domestically produced ordinary tradables for households in
Country B is set at % = 0.8, which is in line with the averages of the sample economies.
For the remaining parameters, following Mocan et al. (2005), the formal/legal human
capital depreciation rate is set at 0.05, while the parameter for the effi ciency of
formal/legal human capital investment, ΘHB, is set at 0.156. Together, these yield
steady-state human capital investment (δHB/ΘHB) that approximates the average
expenditure per student in tertiary education (32 percent of GDP per capita) for the
five sample economies. Given that our stylized model does not separately model drugs
farming, processing, and traffi cking in distinct details, the choice of this combination of
parameters allow us to determine an initial steady-state share of labor hours allocated to
drugs production at 0.15, which is consistent with the usual estimates of
employment/time spent in coca farming by the Andean farmers [see Angrist and Kugler
(2008), Organization of American States (2013), and the various annual reports of
UNODC].
For ordinary tradable production in Country B, the production elasticity, α, is set
at 0.6, which is in line with the average estimated labor share of Guerriero (2012) for
the 5 economies. Given that φ1 = 1 − α must hold to generate endogenous growth in
Country B, the learning externality is set at 0.4, consistent with studies such as Agénor
(2016). For the shift parameter, QB0 = 9.41, its value is derived residually from the relative
human capital (or relative wage) ratio along the BGE, where H̃T,B/H̃ξ,B = w̃ξ,B/w̃ξ,B =






(φ + γ)υAβϑα], the value of which in turn
depends on the parameterization for the drugs sector.
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For the drugs sector, the initial value of the relative human capital ratio, H̃T,B/H̃ξ,B,
is set at 0.25 to reflect a relatively low formal human capital in relation to drug-specific
human capital. This, given an initial w̃ξ,B = 1, yields w̃T,B = 4. With P̃ T = 1, the
steady-state drug price, P̃ ξ, is parameterized based on the average wholesale price of
cocaine base (USD’000 per kg) in 3 of the sample economies with data (Jamaica: USD
5.795, Guatemala: USD 9.329, Honduras: USD7.3), yielding P̃ ξ = 7.5. This then gives
κ̃ = 6.5. In the absence of reliable statistics, and given that it is a policy arrangement that
will be evaluated extensively in our policy experiments, we set the initial value affecting
drugs production capacity, q = 0.5. Given the values of w̃ξ,B, Φ̃ξΞ, q, and L̃ξ,B, using (40),
we can estimate the elasticity of drugs production with respect to drug-specific effective
labor, ϕ, to be 0.076. Lastly, given a value of ρ = 0.05, the shift parameter for distribution
cost, κ0, equals 6.294.
The remaining variables are calibrated as follows. With all the parameters
determined, we can calculate the steady-state value of ordinary tradable consumption in
Country B and A using expressions derived in Appendix B, yielding C̃B = 0.516 and
C̃A = 1.296. Given that Φ̃CAKA = 0.453, we can then determine the benchmark value for
K̃A.14 For the steady-state price of guns, P̃G, we first estimate a price ratio of P̃ ξ/P̃G.
While precise sales estimates for both drugs and guns are impossible to pin down, we
can derive a price ratio based on the respective quantity of production, as well as the
estimated total industry values (NSSF and ATF for guns, UNOCD for drugs). We
estimated P̃ ξ/P̃G = 1.82, which gives P̃G = 4.12. From (41), we also calculate
P̃GG̃F = 1.878, which then gives G̃F = 0.456. Country A’s exported guns-to-physical
capital ratio along the BGE is then estimated to be Φ̃GFKA = 0.159. To ensure the
14As shown in Appendix B, in order for the existence of non-cornered solution for C̃B > 0, the
parameterization must satisfy the analytical conditions, Λ−1(1 + γ)ς
−1
CB − (1− δHB) > 0, which is indeed
the case for our benchmark. In addition, it is also common practice, when implementing numerical policy
experiments for transition dynamic analysis in the later section, to normalize the initial values of K̃A,
C̃B , and C̃A from the unadjusted value to an index of one. These have no effect on the computations of
the gross growth rates of the aforementioned variables.
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parameterization is realistic, we subsequently normalized the guns-to-consumption ratio
in Country A of 0.35, a value that approximates the proportion of American households








(1− ϑ)ϕ(1 + κ̃)ςCA−ϕ(P̃G)ϕ [q(1− ϕ)]−ϕ
}
Φ̃GFKA ,
which then allows us to derive the last parameter value, AR0 = 1.291. In sum, all the
parameter values are summarized in Table 1 and 2.
5 Illustrative Policy Experiments
In the policy debate on modern drug control, a key controversy often surrounds the
question of whether it is most effective for intervention to be in the final consumer stage
(also, prohibition vs. legalization), the initial production stage (interdiction policy at
source country), or the intermediate traffi cking/transshipment stage. In addition, there
are also concerns about the impact of the illicit gun trade on drugs trades (and related
conflicts). Given the rigorous (albeit stylized) analytical foundations of our model, we
set out to answer some of these questions by implementing numerical policy experiments
using the parameterized model. We consider four individual policies: (i) a relaxation in the
overall climate for drug consumption in Country A (increase in π, as a proxy for relaxed
legislation); (ii) a decrease in the drug production capacity in Country B (decrease in q, as
a proxy for more prohibitive supply-side policy); (iii) an increase in the shift parameter for
drug distribution, κ0, so as to reflect costlier drug transshipment; and (iv) an increase in
the tax rate for guns production, τG.15 For consistency of comparison, all simulated policy
experiments involve a permanent one percent change from the respective initial parameter
15It is worth pointing out that, to save space, a policy experiment with regards to human capital
investment effi ciency in Country B, ΘHB , is not presented. As would be seen, all 4 drug-control related
polices considered have only level and not growth effect on Country B’s ordinary tradable production in
the steady state. A permanent increase in ΘHB is the obvious policy to raise the growth rate of tradables
in Country B (for instance, doubling ΘHB will raise steady-state growth rate of Y T,B by 1.1 percent).
However, the policy largely has no steady-state effect on the growth rates of key variables in Country A,
as well as the drugs and guns trades, therefore not being explicitly discussed.
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values. Although these policy experiments involve changes in what some would argue as
deep parameters, the main objective here is to understand the relative impacts and model
behaviors associated with the intervention at vastly different stages of such a “unified”
world (which remains a huge knowledge gap in the present literature, as this cannot
be supported by partial equilibrium frameworks). The experiments implemented would
therefore be enough to meet the objectives without adding further complications.
5.1 Is legalization or prohibition the better approach?
To examine this question, suppose there is a permanent one-percent increase in the
value, π. This can be interpreted as a growing relaxation of drug control policy at the
final consumer market, hence a proxy for potential legalization of drug possession. The
steady-state effects are summarized in Table 3. In the benchmark case, the current-period
drug consumption/production (ξ̃) increases by 0.2 percent from the initial steady state.
For Country A, this corresponds to a 0.2 percent increase in private consumption, given the
constancy of private household consumption allocation between ordinary tradables and
drugs in Country A in the long run (Φ̃CAξ). However, the additional drug consumption
leads to a negative effect onto labor productivity, which over the long run, translates to
a lower growth path for both physical capital stock and tradable output in Country A
(declining by 0.8 percent). This divergence of growth path between consumption and
production in Country A is mainly due to two reasons: (i) a reallocation of resources
in Country A, from formal investment and tradable production activities to those of
consumption (for both tradables and drugs), as can be seen in (45). As such, although the
economy converges to a new stationary equilibrium post-shock, the level of consumption
and capital stock has changed, resulting in the tradable consumption-to-physical capital




t ) being higher in the new equilibrium; and (ii) although the
growth rate of tradable output in Country B is largely unaffected in the long run (as its
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level of production is directly dependent on the production level in Country A), the actual
production level of ordinary tradable production in Country B declines (due to tradable
production level in Country A having declined). This leads to lower levels of household
income and consumption in Country B, hence translating to a lower import demand of
tradable goods from Country A. In combination, these contribute to a lower transitory
growth rate of investment and hence tradable production in Country A.
At the same time, drug production in Country B benefits from the “standing on
shoulder” learning effect associated with the overall expansion in illicit drug trades,
which translates to an expansion in the drug-specific human capital stock. Although the
optimality condition for labor supply in Country B (H̃T,Bw̃T,B = H̃ξ,Bw̃ξ,B) means the
investment in formal human capital will rise too, this further reallocates individuals’
spending away from consumption of ordinary tradables. This decline in domestic
consumption demand, as well as the scale-effect associated with the decline in the
production level in Country A, contributes to a decline in the level of formal tradable
production in Country B, despite the policy being growth-neutral in the long-run.
Lastly, the decline in the growth rate of both Ỹ T,A and K̃A leads to a decline in the
growth rate of guns production, given that its production uses the former as input and
benefits from the spillover effect of the latter. Although not explicitly presented, it is
worth noting that the simulation results with respect to a change in π are largely
monotonic, in that, an opposite experiment of a tougher drug legislation (decline in π)
delivers the opposite effects (albeit at slightly different magnitude) for all the key
variables. In addition, as seen in the sensitivity results presented, the policy effects are
mostly robust to key parameter changes, including both positive and negative elasticities
with regards to labor productivity in Country A. In other words, irrespective of whether
drug consumption improves or reduces labor productivity in Country A, the policy
effects associated with a change in π are robust, and the production-consumption growth
trade-off in Country A is consistently observed.
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“Is legalization or prohibition the better approach?”Based on the analysis, stricter
drug control policy appears to be growth-enhancing to formal tradable activities
(including physical capital investment) in the long run, though households in Country A
experience a decline in consumption growth. As such, if the maximization of private
consumption growth (often a welfare indicator) is the leading objective over production
growth-maximization, then there is a rationale for Country A to relax its drug-control
rule at the cost of some deceleration in the growth of its tradable activities.
5.2 Does more interdiction & prohibitive supply-side policy
work?
Next, we consider policy targeting directly the supply-side, which includes measures
that attempt to eradicate drug cultivation. Such policies can be proxied by a permanent
decrease in the value of the policy variable q, which affects the outcome of drug
production in Country B. We simulate a one-percent decrease in q from the initial value,
with results on the steady-state effects presented in Table 3. This has a negative effect
on the level of drug production, hence translating to a decline in the
current-to-accumulated drug consumption ratio (ΦξΞt ) from 0.525 in the initial steady
state to 0.523 in the new stationary equilibrium. This translates to a decline in the
stock of drug-specific human capital, which for a given relative wage ratio, means an
increase in the level of formal/legal human capital stock in Country B. This in turn
leads to a higher level of ordinary tradable production in Country B. This expansion in
the production level of formal sector in Country B translates to an increase in the
growth of domestic consumption (in Country B) and, given the trade-dependency
between both countries, a higher level of trades between the two countries, and hence a
long-run increase in tradable production in Country A by 1.6 percent. At a given
tradable output-to-physical capital ratio, this means the transitory growth rate of
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physical capital stock also rises by 1.6 percent. By implication, the growth rate of
private consumption in Country A also increases, but at a lower rate of 0.3 percent due
to the overall tradable consumption-to-physical capital ratio (ΦCAKAt ) having declined
from 0.453 in the initial steady state to 0.445 in the new stationary equilibrium (in other
words, although the aggregate resources in Country A has expanded, more of the
additional resources are allocated to investment than consumption).
Nevertheless, the expansion in overall consumption has an unintended income effect :
it also leads to an increase in demand for drugs. In the long run, despite the initial drop
in the level of drug production, the growth rate of current-period drug production will
eventually increase to trace the growth rate of private consumption growth in Country
A. In other words, the expansion in demand over the long run for drugs will eventually
overcome the initial contractionary level effect from the supply side, hence leading to a
slight growth in price of drugs (+0.1 percent) in the new equilibrium.
In terms of the sensitivity analysis results, the long-run policy effects appear to be
robust across most parameters. However, when the demand of tradable inputs in guns
production is a lot more elastic (χ = 0.5), the steady-state expansionary growth effects
observed for tradable production and physical capital in Country A are reversed. In this
instance, the contractionary effect in guns production (associated with the decline in drug
supplies) weights more heavily on tradable production in Country A, and this negativity
dominates the international trade-expansionary effect associated with the higher levels of
tradable production in both countries. In sum, our results show that more prohibitive
supply-side intervention appears to be effective in promoting growth in production and
trades in the formal sectors of both countries. However, if the goal is to reduce the size of
the global illicit drug trades, then a demand side intervention appears to be more effective.
Indeed, this is consistent with the real-world phenomenon observed: despite many ‘war
on drug’ efforts undertaken by certain Latin American governments over the decades,
the drug trades have persisted, with only the ‘balloon effect’observed– drug syndicates
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merely transformed and re-emerged in another location or in different means/mode of
operations over time.
5.3 An increase in drug distribution cost
It is often perceived that growing interdiction of transshipments in the recent decades
had successfully elevated drug prices to a very high level at the final wholesale and retail
levels, which in turn significantly reduced global drug consumption. Is this a universally
good policy? We address this question by simulating a permanent one-percent increase
in the distribution cost parameter, κ0. The steady-state effects are summarized in Table
4. Predictably, the steady-state drug price increases by 6.5 percent. For a given tradable
price, this means drug is relatively more expensive than tradable good, hence leading to
an initial reallocation towards tradable consumption by the private individuals. At the
same time, by virtue of (46), the higher distribution cost means more ordinary tradables
produced in Country B are being used in distributing drugs to Country A, therefore
resulting in a drop in the level of private consumption in Country B.
In the long run, the growth effect turns out to be bad than good, as the adverse
effects associated with the decline in consumption demand and overall income in
Country B outweigh those associated with the expansion in tradable demand in Country
A, thereby resulting in a net negative international trade-expansion effect. This is
despite the fact that the decline in accumulated stock of drug-specific human capital
means, at a given relative wage ratio, the level of formal human capital stock increases,
leading to a permanent increase in the growth rate of relative human capital stock and
therefore, an expansion in the level of ordinary tradable production in Country B.
However, as the growth of formal human capital is almost negligible, the positive effect
on tradable production growth in Country B is therefore only temporary and muted in
the long run. The decline in drugs production also leads to a steady-state drop in the
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demand of the input of guns, the production of which uses ordinary tradables in Country
A. Indeed, the negative trade effect dominates (tradable consumption growth in Country
A) to the extent that, the transitory growth rate of ordinary tradable production in
Country A declines by 1.8 percent in the new stationary equilibrium. Physical capital
stock declines by the same magnitude, and the declining tradable production growth in
Country A reinforces the decline of private consumption in Country B. Finally, in terms
of illicit drug trade, production supply, aided by a persistent demand, eventually catches
up to neutralize the additional transshipment cost, hence resulting in the current-period
drug production growing at the same rate as private consumption in Country A, at 0.11
percent. In sum, these results show that, drug-control intervention at the transshipment
stage appears to not be an effective policy compared to the previous two experiments
considered. The sensitivity analysis results largely reaffi rm these findings.
5.4 The controversial drug-gun trade nexus
A permanent one-percent increase in the tax rate on guns production, τG is simulated.
The steady-state effects of selected variables are presented in Table 4. Recall that our
stylized model essentially treats all illicit component of world gun trades as the exported
share, whereas the purchase made by the government in Country A can be interpreted
as all other legal purchases. As such, although this experiment does not shed light on
the heated domestic gun-control debate that has been taking place in the United States
recently, it does refer to a taxation/fee that is levied on the production of all guns. In
Table 4, it is seen that the tax rate is growth-neutral on drugs production in the long run,
despite guns being modelled as a factor of production for drugs. Given this, the long-run
effect on current-to-accumulated drug consumption ratio is also muted, therefore leading
to growth neutrality in the relative human capital stock in Country B too. At a given
ordinary tradable-drugs consumption ratio, the long-run growth neutrality of ξ̃ means
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the growth effect of private consumption of tradables in Country A is also muted. To
rationalize this, the higher tax levied at production is likely to lead to an instantaneous
decline in guns’supply. At the initial factor-price ratio for guns production, this negative
supply shock leads to a decrease in drugs production on impact and by implication, the
growth rate of drug-specific human capital. At a given initial level of relative stock
of human capital, this translates to an increase in the growth rate of relative human
capital stock in Country B in the short run. However, the decline in current-period drug
production means drug price also increases, leading to a decline in drug consumption. At
an initial optimal consumption allocation, household in Country A consumes less, leading
to a decline in ordinary tradable production in Country B. Nevertheless, given that the
optimality condition for drugs production remains unchanged, the actual world price of
guns remains unchanged. From the optimality condition in (23), the guns manufacturer
eventually makes up for this production levy by producing more guns (+0.01 percent) and
in the process, demands more tradable inputs. This translates to a steady-state increase
of the same magnitude for the growth of tradable production and physical capital stock in
Country B, and consequently via international trade, the growth of private consumption
in Country B. As all the other production dynamics in Country B are unaffected by
this policy in the long-run, growth neutrality is eventually observed for the growth rates
of tradables, relative human capital stock, and drugs production in Country B as the
economy converges to the new steady state.
The experiment shows that, any non-quota gun-control policy, such as a tax levied
on production, will have no long-term implication on illicit guns trade, if there is no
fundamental change to its demand and supply. This, together with the limited long-run
growth effect observed with transshipment intervention, is consistent with the logic of
the “drug-producer compensates with increased higher productivity”effect documented in
Ortiz (2003, 2009), hence partly explains the limited effect of drug traffi cking-control
measures in the region (Reuter and Trautmann, 2009).
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5.5 Further analysis - Drug policies and trade openness
Based on the results of the individual policies considered, the long-run growth effects
of the two major drug control policies are further evaluated in the context of varying
trade openness in Table 5 and 6. Specifically, in Table 5, the first policy experiment
with regards to π is repeatedly simulated with different parameterization of the share of
domestically produced tradables in the aggregate consumption of household in Country
A, θ. In addition, given the well-documented significance of the (anti-) persistency rate,
φ, in the rational addiction literature, we also evaluate the policy outcome across φ ∈
(0.1, 0.9). The initial value of φ is structurally significant in that, for any given value of
θ, there is a range of value for φ where the growth effect of production in Country A is
positive, when drug law is liberalized. Indeed, the more open Country A is (smaller θ),
the wider the range of φ with positive growth effect, hence providing greater possibility for
drug liberalization policy to be growth-enhancing. Overall, despite a completely different
framework, our findings are mainly consistent with Becker et al. (2006), in that, the more
addictive drug is, the greater the increase in the social cost from using greater enforcement;
the less past addiction influences current consumption, there is greater room for potential
benefits in pursuing drug liberalization.
In Table 6, we assess the policy that is more relevant to Country B, which is the
experiment of a permanent decrease in the value affecting drugs production, q, across a
range of Country B’ consumption share of domestically produced tradables (%).
Moreover, given that the guns’ production elasticity, χ, is observed to be a critical
parameter in the benchmark analysis, we also evaluate the policy effectiveness (in terms
of private consumption growth in Country B) across different χ values. A clear
structural break-point for χ is observed for the different % values considered, below
which the growth effect on consumption in Country B is positive. It appears that, the
more “closed”Country B is (in terms of its individuals’consumption share), the lower
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the structural break-point for χ is. Given that the Arrow-Romer externality effect in
guns production sector is given by ω = 1 − χ, this provides a natural policy
interpretation. In essence, if Country B is more “closed” (higher % value), in order for
prohibitive supply-side policy to be growth-enhancing to household consumption in
Country B, the learning externality or degree of knowledge spillover in the
guns-production industry would need to be higher. In other words, this means the
knowledge/learning effect brought about from the firearms trade to Country B will have
to be a lot larger if the economy is characterized a lack of trade openness.
6 Concluding Remarks
The illicit drug trade, as well as its associated illicit trades in firearms, remains highly
persistent despite the plethora of control policies proposed globally. In this context, the
activities by drug-related syndicates based in the Central American and Caribbean regions
continue to be a subject of frequent press coverage in the United States. In this paper we
present a unified growth framework that includes the integration of formal international
trade and illicit drug-for-gun trade, as well as different drugs control policies aimed at
consumers, producers and intermediate trans-shipments. Specially, we contributes to the
literature by developing a two-country, multi-sectorial dynamic general equilibrium model
of endogenous growth with drugs and guns trade.
This approach allowed us to fill the three major gaps in existing analytical literature,
namely: (i) examine the dynamic tradeoff and growth implications of drug-control
policies across the full spectrum of the illicit drug trades in both consuming and
producing countries; (ii) explicitly model the firearm market– albeit in a stylized
manner– and explore its link to the illicit drugs trade; (iii) analyze the spillover effects
between illicit trades and formal international trades.
The numerical policy experiments (using parameterized version of the model)
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uncover a production-consumption growth trade-off that is not previously documented in
the literature. We show that if maximizing household consumption growth is the policy
priority in drug-consuming countries, then drug liberalization could be growth
enhancing. In fact, our results show that in the absence of a fundamental change to
drug demand, drug control policies are unlikely to reduce illicit trades for drugs and
guns in the long run. This is consistent with the argument that managing potential
addiction by treating it as a public health issue as opposed to a criminal issue is the
optimal policy choice. On the contrary, direct supply-side policy aimed at eradicating
drug cultivation (the normal “War on Drugs” approach) in supplying countries would
only be effective if there is a high degree of trade openness in these countries.
Despite the contributions, there remain shortcomings that future studies can address.
While we believe the model provides a better ‘world-view’ to the illicit trades, some
features of vertically-integrated models, such as those highlighted in Mejía and Restrepo
(2016) were not included in our analysis for brevity. Our model therefore is unable to
account for phenomenon such as the ‘balloon effect’(the ability of drug production to move
to a new location or across international borders), and any resulting spike in violence and
conflicts associated with drugs trades.
In addition, while we accounted for rational addiction in the modelling of
drug-consumers, we omitted the possibility of asymmetric information and costly search,
such as in Galenianos et al. (2012). The same can be said for the illicit guns trade,
which we modelled in a very simplistic manner. For future research, any attempt to
“expand the universe”of the model will necessarily involve accounting for these features.
Furthermore, with greater availability of data, given the notorious volatility in drug
supply and prices, the introduction of more stochastic elements into a dynamic model to
capture more realistic short-term movements in drug prices is also warranted.
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Table 1
Benchmark Parameter Values, Country A
Parameter Description Value
Country A - Households
Λ Subjective discount factor 0.995
ηL Preference parameter, disutility of labor 2.0
ψ Inverse of Frisch elasticity of labor supply 1.5
ςCA Elasticity of intertemporal substitution, ordinary goods 0.667
π Overall climate factor, drugs possession 0.5
ηΞ Preference parameter, rational addiction 0.852
φ Rate of (anti-)persistence, accumulated drugs consumed 0.5
θ Share of domestically produced ordinary tradables 0.855
ςΞ Elasticity of intertemporal substitution, drugs 2.174
δK Physical capital depreciation 0.20
Country A - Production
β Elasticity of ordinary tradables wrt effective labor 0.64
QT,A0 Productivity parameter, ordinary tradables 0.1213
$T Strength of Arrow-Romer externality, physical capital stock 0.64
υA Elasticity of labor productivity wrt drugs consumption −0.018
AA0 Productivity parameter, base labor productivity level 14.59
χ Elasticity of guns’production wrt tradable inputs 0.5
ω Production externality from economywide physical capital stock 0.95
AG0 Time-invariant productivity parameter for guns’production 1.0
Country A - Government
ν Share of gov. consumption in domestically produced tradables 0.340
τL Labor income tax rate 0.174
τK Physical capital income tax rate 0.350
τG Taxation on guns’sales 0.003
z Fraction of realizable value from confiscated drugs 0.100
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Table 2
Benchmark Parameter Values, Country B
Parameter Description Value
Country B - Individuals
ςCB Elasticity of intertemporal substitution, ordinary goods 0.667
ψB Inverse of Frisch elasticity of labor supply 1.5
ηB Preference parameter, disutility of labor 2.0
ΘHB Parameter, effi ciency of human capital investment 0.156
δHB Formal/legal human capital depreciation rate 0.05
% Share of domestically produced ordinary tradables 0.8
Country B - Production
α Elasticity of ordinary tradables wrt effective labor 0.6
QB0 Productivity parameter, ordinary tradables 9.41
φ1 Strength of Arrow-Romer externality, formal human capital 0.4
Country B - Drug syndicate & distribution
AR0 Productivity parameter, drugs production 1.291
ϕ Elasticity of drugs production wrt drug-specific effective labor 0.076
q Uncertain drug-production capacity 0.5
κ0 Distribution cost parameter, drugs trade 6.294
ρ Elasticity of distr. cost wrt current-to-accumulated world drugs trade 0.05
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A relaxation in the overall drug consumption climate in Country A ( π)
Initial Values Benchmark νA = -0.072 νA = 0.072 φ = 0.1 ρ = 0.5 β = 0.3
Growth of tradable output in Country A 0.025 -0.0083 -0.0082 -0.0085 -0.0295 -0.0101 -0.0085
Growth of private consumption, Country A 0.025 0.0020 0.0020 0.0020 0.0005 0.0021 0.0020
Growth of physical capital stock, Country A 0.025 -0.0083 -0.0082 -0.0085 -0.0295 -0.0101 -0.0085
Growth of tradable output in Country B 0.025 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Growth of private consumption, Country B 0.025 -0.0083 -0.0082 -0.0085 -0.0295 -0.0101 -0.0085
Growth of relative human capital stock, Country B 0.000 0.0011 0.0011 0.0011 0.0003 0.0011 0.0011
Growth of current-period drug production 0.025 0.0020 0.0020 0.0020 0.0005 0.0021 0.0020
Current-to-accumulated drug consumption ratio 0.525 -0.0011 -0.0011 -0.0011 -0.0003 -0.0011 -0.0011
Price of drugs 7.500 0.0007 0.0007 0.0007 0.0007 0.0071 0.0007
Growth of total guns production 0.025 -0.0083 -0.0082 -0.0085 -0.0295 -0.0101 -0.0085
Price of guns 4.120 0.0009 0.0009 0.0009 0.0020 0.0040 0.0009
A decrease in the drug production capacity in Country B (q)
Initial Values Benchmark νA = -0.072 νA = 0.072 χ = 0.5 ρ = 0.5 α = 0.3
Growth of tradable output in Country A 0.025 0.0157 0.0158 0.0154 -0.0242 0.0130 0.0187
Growth of private consumption, Country A 0.025 0.0030 0.0030 0.0031 0.0030 0.0032 0.0030
Growth of physical capital stock, Country A 0.025 0.0157 0.0158 0.0154 -0.0242 0.0130 0.0187
Growth of tradable output in Country B 0.025 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Growth of private consumption, Country B 0.025 0.0157 0.0158 0.0154 -0.0242 0.0130 0.0187
Growth of relative human capital stock, Country B 0.000 0.0016 0.0016 0.0016 0.0016 0.0017 0.0016
Growth of current-period drug production 0.025 0.0030 0.0030 0.0031 0.0030 0.0032 0.0030
Current-to-accumulated drug consumption ratio 0.525 -0.0016 -0.0016 -0.0016 -0.0016 -0.0017 -0.0016
Price of drugs 7.500 0.0010 0.0010 0.0010 0.0010 0.0106 0.0010
Growth of total guns production 0.025 0.0157 0.0158 0.0154 -0.0242 0.0130 0.0187
Price of guns 4.120 -0.0338 -0.0338 -0.0338 -0.0338 -0.0293 -0.0338
Note: All simulated policies represent a one percent shock from the initial value of the relevant policy arrangement.
Source: Authors' calculations.
An increase in the price mark-up shift parameter for drug distribution ( κ0)
Initial Values Benchmark νA = -0.072 νA = 0.072 φ = 0.1 ρ = 0.5 β = 0.3
Growth of tradable output in Country A 0.025 -0.0181 -0.0181 -0.0182 -0.0378 -0.0191 -0.0195
Growth of private consumption, Country A 0.025 0.0011 0.0011 0.0012 0.0000 0.0012 0.0011
Growth of physical capital stock, Country A 0.025 -0.0181 -0.0181 -0.0182 -0.0378 -0.0191 -0.0195
Growth of tradable output in Country B 0.025 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Growth of private consumption, Country B 0.025 -0.0181 -0.0181 -0.0182 -0.0378 -0.0191 -0.0195
Growth of relative human capital stock, Country B 0.000 0.0006 0.0006 0.0006 0.0000 0.0006 0.0006
Growth of current-period drug production 0.025 0.0011 0.0011 0.0012 0.0000 0.0012 0.0011
Current-to-accumulated drug consumption ratio 0.525 -0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0006 0.0000 -0.0006 -0.0006
Price of drugs 7.500 0.0654 0.0654 0.0654 0.0650 0.0690 0.0654
Growth of total guns production 0.025 -0.0181 -0.0181 -0.0182 -0.0378 -0.0191 -0.0195
Price of guns 4.120 0.0310 0.0310 0.0310 0.0165 0.0327 0.0310
An increase in the tax rate on guns sales ( τG)
Initial Values Benchmark νA = -0.072 νA = 0.072 χ = 0.5 ρ = 0.5 α = 0.3
Growth of tradable output in Country A 0.025 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 -0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
Growth of private consumption, Country A 0.025 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Growth of physical capital stock, Country A 0.025 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 -0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
Growth of tradable output in Country B 0.025 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Growth of private consumption, Country B 0.025 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 -0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
Growth of relative human capital stock, Country B 0.000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Growth of current-period drug production 0.025 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Current-to-accumulated drug consumption ratio 0.525 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Price of drugs 7.500 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Growth of total guns production 0.025 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 -0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
Price of guns 4.120 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Note: All simulated policies represent a one percent shock from the initial value of the relevant policy arrangement.
Source: Authors' calculations.
Table 4
Results Summary for Policy Experiments: Change in Transitory Growth Rates (continue)
(Absolute deviations from baseline)
Table 3
Results Summary for Policy Experiments: Change in Transitory Growth Rates
(Absolute deviations from baseline)
Country A's consumption share of 
domestically produced (θ)




Rate of (anti-)persistence φ
0.1 -0.0002 -0.0027 -0.0074 -0.0160 -0.0295 -0.0366
0.2 0.0010 -0.0007 -0.0035 -0.0077 -0.0127 -0.0147
0.3 0.0013 -0.0002 -0.0026 -0.0060 -0.0100 -0.0114
0.4 0.0014 0.0000 -0.0022 -0.0054 -0.0089 -0.0102
0.5 (Benchmark) 0.0015 0.0001 -0.0020 -0.0050 -0.0083 -0.0095
0.6 0.0015 0.0002 -0.0018 -0.0048 -0.0080 -0.0091
0.7 0.0015 0.0003 -0.0018 -0.0046 -0.0078 -0.0089
0.8 0.0016 0.0003 -0.0017 -0.0045 -0.0076 -0.0087
0.9 0.0016 0.0003 -0.0017 -0.0045 -0.0075 -0.0086
Country B' consumption share of 
domestically produced (ϱ)




Elasticity of guns' production wrt tradable 
inputs χ
0.05 (Benchmark) 0.0018 0.0053 0.0087 0.0122 0.0157 0.0191
0.10 0.0037 0.0082 0.0132 0.0185 0.0245 0.0310
0.15 0.0070 0.0142 0.0233 0.0353 0.0516 0.0752
0.20 0.0132 0.0282 0.0552 0.0678 0.0742 -0.0983
0.25 0.0298 0.0657 -0.0899 -0.0870 -0.0813 -0.0720
0.30 0.0723 -0.1306 -0.0691 -0.0538 -0.0469 -0.0429
0.35 -0.0765 -0.0481 -0.0401 -0.0364 -0.0342 -0.0327
0.40 -0.0387 -0.0332 -0.0308 -0.0294 -0.0285 -0.0278
0.45 -0.0294 -0.0275 -0.0266 -0.0260 -0.0256 -0.0253
0.313 0.276 0.248 0.226 0.207 0.193
Indicative structural break-point for ω: 0.687 0.724 0.752 0.774 0.793 0.807
A decrease in the drug production capacity in Country B by one percent from initial probability value (q)
Structural break-point for χ, for a given 
consumption share of domestically-
produced in Country B:
    Different value of φ and  θ
                Different value of χ and  ϱ
Table 6
More Prohibitive Supply-side Policy - Growth effects on Private Consumption in Country B:                               
(Absolute deviations from baseline)
Drug Legalisation in Consumer Market - Long-run Growth effects in Country A:                                                            
(Absolute deviations from baseline)




Source: Small Arms Survey 2017; UNODC Drug Statistics, World Development Indicators 
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